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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

LA\VRENCE H. STRATFORD and
ELLA L. STRATFORD,
Plaintiffs and Respondents .

-vs.-

Case No. 9198

GI£0RGE G. vVOOD and LEAH C.
\VOOD, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF F A·CTS
~\~ stated in appellant's brief, this case involves an
action to quiet title to real property and for damages
arising out of the use of respondents' property by appellants. Appellants' answer claimed a prescriptive right to
the use of respondents' property. By the pre-trial order,
the issues of the case were designated as being three in
nnn1ber, as follows: (1) 'Vhether or not there was a
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prescriptive use as claimed by appellants; (2) The location of the survey line between the property of appellants
and that of respondents, i.e., whether the correct survey
line is that established by Robert A. Vlilkins, or that fixed
hy Bush & Gudgell; ( 3) The damages to respondents
(R. 6).
Rather than approaching the facts of the case by way
of an abstract of the trial transcript, as was done in appellants' brief, respondents believe a chronological approach will prove more helpful to the Court in understanding the case. At the time of the trial and for some
years prior, respondents were the owners of Lots 11 to 13,
inclusive, and appellants were the owners of Lot 10 and
part of Lot 9 of Block 5 of the Groves Subdivision in
Emigration Canyon. These properties adjoin one another. There is no fence or other physical dividing line
between the two properties.
From 1928 until 1939, Lots 11 to 13 were owned by
Emeline L. Whitney. In 1939 this land was conveyed to
respondents (Exh. P-2, pages 19, 24). During the period
from about 1927 until 1941, Lot No. 10 was owned by
1\frs. Whitney's daughter-in-law, Mrs. Edwin Whitney
(R. 117; Exh. P-10; R. 121). In 1941, Lot No.10 was conveyed to James A. Stevenson (Exh. P-10), who conveyed
it to appellants in 1943 (Exh. P-12).
At the tune the Edwin Whitneys acquired Lot 10,
there were stakes on all four corners of the property, and
these stakes were recognized as the boundary line between
Lots 10 and 11 (R. 117). Mr. Whitney testified that the
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l()('at ion of the boundary line between Lot~ 10 and 11 as
tile propt•rty \\·as recognized b~· his rnother and hirnself
during the time they owned the propert~· ·was within a
foot to a foot and a half of the location of the corner
n~ established by the survey of Bush and Gudgell (H.
111-S). On motion of appellants' counsel, the evidence
of where the vVhitneys recognized the property line to
he \nu.; excluded b~· the Court. Counsel contended, in obtaining the exclusion of this evidence, that there \Vas no
shmring that the stakes which the vVhitneys recognized
a~ the boundary line were sluve~· stakes (R. 121).

Prior to 1943, when appellants acquired Lot l\ o. 10,
had never been on the property (R. 91). At the
time appellants purchased the property there were two
patio areas to the north of their cabin, in rnuch the same
loeation as they are presently located on the land (R.
s;)). Appellant testified that they use [present tense]
tlw~f' patio areas when they have guests con1e to their
cabin (R. 86). There was no evidence as to how early
appellant started this use, nor how frequent the use was.

the~·

In June of 1954, appellants built a cabin on Lot No.
11, owned by respondents (R. 45; 51), and also constructed a large conerete picnic. table on one of the patio areas .
.\t the time the eabin was being eompleted, respondents
had a conversation with appellant and requested that
he rernove the cabin from respondents' property (R. 47,
;):2 l. Respondents repeatedly requested appellants to remove the cabin, but appellant would only respond by asking how they knew it was on respondents' land (R. 47).
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As a result of these conversations, respondents had surveys made of the property, in an effort to get appellants
to retnove the cabin fron1 respondents' property, which
he never did (R. 48-9).
The first survey was made by Robert A. \Vilkins,
a n1an 72 years of age. He testified he had not located
the section corner to which the subdivision was tied (R.
72). He stated that in 1937 he had surveyed smne land
in the vicinity, and at that time he had seen a sandstone
n1onu1nent at what he determined was the corner of Lot
13 of Block 17. In making his survey in 1956, the sandstone 1nonu1nent was not to be found (R. 71), so he comInenced his survey of the property from a place which his
recollection told him the monument had been 19 years before (R. 70-3). Starting from this beginning point, he
ran his survey by 1neans of traverse lines (R. 73), the
angles on which he turned by the use of the con1pass of
his transit (R. 78). He testified that he did not check
the accuracy of his traverse line by running the traverse
line back to his beginning point, but rather had only rllll
his traverse line to the property (R. 83).
The official plat of the Groves Subdivision contains
no reference to any sandstone monument, such as Mr.
Wilkins testified he had tied his survey in 1937 (Exh.
P-4).
The second survey made of the property by respondents was conducted by George Gudgell of Bush & Gudgell. In 1naking his survey, the section corner to which
the subdiivsion is tied was located (R-14), and the survey
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nm l'rom there "·'" the use of the Yl~rmer scale on the
t rau~it to turn angles. A traverse line was run up to the
propPrty and a return traverse line was run to check the
orginal, which closed accurately to approxi1nately one and
a half inches ( R. 107). In addition to tieing the survey to
tltt> ~Pdion eorner~ J\Ir. Gudgell checked his survey line
agnin~t hro eotmt~, 1nonun1ents placed in the road up the
('an~·mt, \\·hieh are in turn tied into the section corner by
the 8alt Lake County surveyor. 1-lere again there -vvas a
\·t·r~· <'lo~P check to his survey line (Exh. P-3; R. 15-16).
In running up the canyon to respondents' property, 1\Lr.
(; wlg('ll also tied in several fence lines which checked out
quite close to his survey (R. 16). A1nong the natural
monuments which J\lr. Gudgell checked to on his survey
\ra~ a rock wall and fence corner dividing appellants'
propert~, frmn that of his neighbor to the south and this
<'ltecked YPr~- close, indicating appellants under the Gudgeli HUTe~· has the entire eighty feet of land ·which they
purchased, independent of the patio area which vvas in
eonfliet at the trial ( Exh. P -5 ; R. 21).
::\lr. \\'"ilkin~ loeated the property line 17.~ feet northerly frmn 1Ir. Gudgell's location. The cabin built by
appellants was ten feet north of Mr. \Vilkins line on
respondents' property. The importance of the testimony
of :Jlr. \Vilkins as to how he ran his survey line was
demonstrated to the jury by J\t[r. Gudgell who showed
them the difference between turning angles with a compass versus turning them with the vernier scale of the
transit. The transit compass is only divided into 360
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degrees. The vernier scale on the transit accurately
divides each of the 360 degrees of a circle into 60 parts
so that the chance of error in turning the angle is greatly
1ninirnized (R. 106). Further, hy the use of a compass,
the presence of any n1etallic substance in the near vicinity
can pull the compass needle off. ~.fr. Gudgell testified
that a 1netallic pencil in the surveyor's pocket could pull
the compass off as n1uch as three or four degrees if the
pencil were within three or four inches of the cmnpass
(R.107).
A third survey line was rnade by l\1r. Arnold Coon
for appellants. Iie located the division between the properties three-eighth of an inch frmn where l\1r. Gudgell
did (R. 114).
Appellants had the use of Lot No. 11 for a period
of five and one-half years frmn June 1954 to the time
of trial. Respondents did not have any use of the property during that period while they were atte1npting to get
appellants off (R. 54). Respondents therefore claimed
damages for the loss of use of the premises during that
period. Further respondents claimed damages for the
cost of re1noving the cabin frmn their property. ::\Ir.
I{etchuln testified as an expert that if the cabin were to
be removed without substantial damage to the trees and
foliage on the lot, it would cost $100.00 (R. 30-1).
l\ir. Holt testified as an expert witness that the value
of Lot 11 was $2500.00 (R. 35), and that the rental value
of the land would be $250.00 per year (R. 36). On exmnination b)~ the Court, the witness testified that the
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lntHl

wa~

of valne to tlw public only for cabins .

.At thP conclu~ion of appellants' case, a nwtion for
a di rPdPd ve rdid wa~ granted on the i~~lW of w·hether or
not appellants had established a prescriptive use on
rP~pondents' property. ~ o (1uestion of the correctness of
tlw court's granting of this rnotion is made on this appeal.
At the tin1e counsel for appellants was nmking his
argument~

to the jur~·. he rnade the staternent that the
propt-rt:· in dispute between the two surveys had been
mwd h:· appellants' predecessors for 35 years. Respondent:-; objected to this argtunent and the court sustained
rP~llondPnt~' objection. After counsel had con1pleted his
argument and the jury had retired, the court stated the
matter into the record, and the parties thereupon stated
their position~ with respect to the excluded argtnnent (R.
138--!0).
STA~eE~IENT

OF POINTS

POINT ONE
THE ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL AS TO USE OF THE
PROPERTY BETWEEN THE TWO SURVEY LINES WAS
ll\IPROPER, AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED SUCH ARGUMENT.
POINT TWO
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN CONNECTION
WITH THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS COON.
POINT THREE
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING DAMAGES IS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW WITH
RESPECT THERETO.
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL AS TO USE OF THE
PROPERTY BETWEEN THE TWO SURVEY LINES WAS
IMPROPER, AND THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED SUCH ARGUMENT.

At the conclusion of appellants' case, the trial court
granted a motion for a directed verdict on the issue of
whether or not appellants had any prescriptive right to
the use of the respondents lands. No error is assigned
to this ruling on appeal, and therefore, it must be deemed
to have been proper.
There were therefore only two issues for the jury
to determine: (1) whether the Gudgell survey was correct, or whether the Wilkins survey was correct; and (2)
the amount of damages to which respondents were entitled. There was no contention made for a boundary
line by acquiescence.
Prior to the time that the court had made its ruling
on the question of prescriptive rights, there was certain
evidence which could properly come into the case for its
probative value on the question of prescriptive use, which
would have been improper were that issue not involved
in the case. A brief examination of this evidence is therefore appropriate to detennine first of all, whether counsel's rmnarks were supported by the evidence, and secondly whether this evidence could properly be considered
as bearing upon the two issues which were submitted
to the jury.
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tltr question of how the property ·was used, there
only hro witues:::;es whose testirnony touched upon
this point: Appellant and Edwin vVhitney.
( )n

\\'l'I'P

Appellant first rnoved onto the property rn 1943.
He \Hls asked to describe the condition in 1943 of the
a rt>a between his main cabin and the sleeping cabin which
lw built. He described two patio areas and a generator
house a~ being in the area (R. 85). In addition, he volunterrecl two additional pieces of information: (1) that
the ('OllC'l'ete on the patio had been built by Ed vVhitney in
1!l:2-h ancl contained :Mr. Whitney's son's initials "T. vV.",
and (:~) that I\lr. vVhitney generated the electricity for his
house frmn the generator shed (R. 85). He next testified
that the patio areas are the same size nmv as they ·were
in 19-13, that he built a concrete table to seat 17 persons
on on patio, and that his ·wife uses the other one for a
erowd of people she gets up there. Important in this conneetion is that l\ir. \Yood -vvas testifying in the present
tense in connection ·with the use of the patio areas by hirn
and his wife (R. 86).
{~pon

cross exan1ination nfr. Wood testified that he
had never been on the property until 1943 when he purehased it (R. 91). He testified that he did not know of
the \\·ay the property was used by his irnmediate predecessor, l\[r. Stevenson, except that Mr. Stevenson didn't
use any of the property very much based upon the condition of the main cabin when they bought the property
(R. 91). lie testified that he could not say one way or the
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other as to whether :Mr. Stevenson used the patio areas
(R. 92).
r_ehe other witness who offered any testimony as to
the use of the property was .Mr. Edwin Whitney. His
testi1nony was offered after respondents' 1notion for
directed verdict was granted by the court. His testimony
offers an interesting cmnparison with the matters which
counsel attmnpted to argue at the trial, and vd1ich he
states as being a fact in the brief. First, he testified that
he acquired his property in 1927 (R. 114), three years
after he is supposed to have built the patios according
to appellant's testimony. lie and his mother, who owned
the Stratford lot at this tin1e, recognized a boundary line
very close to that established by :Mr. Gudgell, according
to son1e stakes which were located at the corners of the
property when he acquired it (R. 117-8).
To Mr. Whitney's testi1nony, appellants' counsel
objected on the basis that the stake to which l\fr. Whitney
referred as being the boundary line recognized by him
and his mother was not shown to be a surveyor's stake
(R. 121). The court then ordered the jury to disregard
l\Ir. Whitney's testi1nony as to the stakes on the property as not being shown to be a correct survey line (R.
123).
From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that there
was no competent evidence which was admitted as to any
past use of the area between the two survey lines. Taking appellants' testimony at full value, even though it is
obvious that he had no personal knowledge whatsoever
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ot' the true J'ads prior to 19-!3, we have only that ~Ir.
\\"hitm·)· built two patios and a generator shed on his
nwth<>r'~ property. It should be rather obvious that a
son can build structures on his 1nother's land without
hi~ nd~ meaning the son clain1s mvnership of the land
or even of the structures. There is no evidence whatsoever as to how the property was utilized prior to J nne
of 1954 when ~[r. \Vood built the picnic table and cabin.
Gauging counsel's arguments in the light of the evidence
manifests that it was improper for him to argue to the
jury that the land between the Wilkins and Gudgell surH')' had been occupied for 35 years by the owners of the
'V ood cabin, when the evidence does not support the
statement, and the court had ruled out any question of
adverse user.

If, as appellants contend, the parties owning appellants' property had used the area between the two surve)'S for a period of 35 years, it is apparent that appellants would have been entitled as a matter of law to a
prescriptive right to use the property. Yet appellants
do not argue that the court committed error in directing
a verdict that appellants had no prescriptive right by 20
years user.
The law is very clear that counsel must keep his argmnent confined to the questions in issue and the evidence relating to these issues.
In 53 An1. Jur. 385, Trials, Section 480, it is said:
"It is fundamental that the argument of counsel should at all ti1nes be confined to the questions
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in issue and the evidence relating thereto adduced
at the trial, and such inferences, deductions, and
analogies as can reasonably and properly be
drawn therefrom. There is no rule of trial practice more universally accepted and applied than
the rule that counsel may not introduce into his
argument to the jury statements unsupported by
evidence produced on the trial and made not as
expressions of belief or opinion, but as assertions
of fact. Judicial censure of misstatements of the
evidence by counsel in arguing their case or statements of facts not in evidence or not warranted
as a deduction fron1 the evidence has been equally
emphatic in both civil and criminal cases."
See also 88 CJS, p. 354, Trials, Section 181 (a).
In his argument Counsel \Yas attempting first to
bring in matters which ·were not in evidence as to the use
to \vhich the land lying between the survey lines had been
put; and secondly to argue a matter which \\·as no longer
an issue in the case, since the court had determined as a
n1atter of la\Y that appellants and their predecessors
in interest had failed to prove a prescriptive use of respondents' property.
The sole issue for the jury in this connection was
whether the Bush & Gudgell survey or the Wilkins survey
was correct. Absent a showing of a boundary by acquiescence, adverse user, or a prescriptive right the question
of hmv the property was used is conlpletel:- in11naterial.
This was pointed out by appellants' counsel in obtaining
the exclusion of

~Ir.

vVhitney's testi1nony of the recog-

ni/';ed property line prior to 1\fr. \Y ood's acquisition.
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rl 1 hP jury had before it the testin1ony Of three expert
,, it n<'~~p:-;, P<H'h of whmn had 1neasured to location of

the diyi:-;ion line between the properties. An examination
of t h<' beginning point technique used by Mr. vVilkins
all(l the 1nethods used to run his survey line 1nakes it
<'lPar

as to why the jury chose to believe the correctness

of the line as found by both Mr. Gudgell and Mr. Coon.
Appellants under the survey of Bush & Gudgell have the
full SO feet. which they purchased, and have no right whatsoever to any of respondents' land.
POINT TWO
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN CONNECTION
WITH THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESS COON.

Arnold W. Coon, a licensed engineer and land surn•yor, ·was called as a rebuttal witness by plaintiffs. He
had been retained by the appellants to check the location
of the division between appellants and respondents property (R. 110). He had previously checked l\ir. Gudgell's
calculations and procedures in order to determine their
accuracy (R. 110). Thereafter he ran an independent
cheek of the location of the Wilkins survey and of the
Bush & Gudgell survey and tied in both surveys at that
tin1e (R. 111). The Coon survey located the property
bolmdary line about three-eighths of an inch in a NorthSouth direction and two and five-eighths inches in an
East-\Y est direction from the Bush and Gudgell survey
location (R. 114). He had found the loeation of the Wilkins boundary line to be 17.2 feet distant from that of
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l\fr. Gudgell in a line which would be approximately parallel to the front lot line of Lot No. 11 (R. 112-13).
The witness was asked, based upon his own calculations of the line, whether in his opinion the Wilkins location of the line was correct or incorrect. The court,
prior to the witness answering the question, asked him
whether or not he had a professional knowledge that he
was calling upon and was not Inaking a guess as to
whether or not the Wilkins survey was correct (R. 113).
When the witness stated that he did, the court permitted
him to answer question, and the witness testified that his
survey would indicate that the Wilkins survey was incorrect (R. 114).
Counsel for appellants objected that the question was
leading, suggestive and calling for a conclusion which was
_not the province of the jury. The objection was overruled
(R. 113). This ruling of the Court is argued on appeal as
being reversible error.
The opinion expressed by witness Coon was based
upon his own investigation and expert lmowledge. He wa:;
testifying as an expert in a field as to which the jury as
layn1en would need assistance in determining the question
·which was before then1. It is submitted that this form of
expert opinion would not be objectionable as being "·within the province of the jury" even in those jurisdictions
still adhering to this illogical rule of evidence.
However, without delving into the academics of
whether or not this fonn of expert opinion goes to the
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ultimate issue of fact or not, it is sub1nitted that the
rules of evidence enunciated h:v this Court render this
form of opinion evidence unobjectionable. In the recent
ea::;e::-; decided ~~~- this court bearing upon the point raised
in appellanhs' brief, this court had adopted the position
Pxpre::-;::;ed in \\'ignwre on Evidence, Third Edition, Sections 1920 and 1921.
The n1ost recent Utah case found bearing upon this
point is the case of Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latte.r-day
Sai11fs H ospi.tal,. 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P (2nd) 330. In disposing of certain points assigned as error, the court says :
"The first is plaintiffs contention that a nurse
who cared for deceased could not express an
opinon that she was given good nursing care. The
objection was on the ground that this was the
ver~~ issue to be decided by the jury, and the witness thus invaded its province. This objection is
untenable. Whether the testiinony of an expert is
as 'to the very issue before the jury' is not a
proper test as to its admissability. vVhere the
subject of inquiry is in a field beyond the knowledge generally possessed by laymen, one properly
qualified therein n1ay be permitted to testify to
his opinion as an expert. If the opinion evidence
is such that it will aid the jury in understanding
their problems and lead the1n to the truth as to
disputed issues of fact, it is competent and adInissable, irrespective of whether it bears directly
on the ultimate fact the jury is to determine. And
the trial judge is allowed a wide discretion in regard to the allowance of such testimony."
The dissent in this case by Justices :McDonough and
Henriod goes to other points involved in the case. On the
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point above cited, the dissenting op1n10n says: "Since
I agree with the court's disposition of the other errors
assigned, I would affirm the judgment below."
Noteworthy in connection with the point here under
consideration is that the Committee on Uniform Rules of
Evidence, appointed by the Utah Supreme Court, in its
Final Draft of the Rules of Evidence submitted to this
Court on l\1arch 2, 1959, at page 31, in Rule 56 (4) recommends the adoption of the rule as stated in the Joseph
case above cited, as follows:
" (4) Testimony in the form of opinions or
inferences otherwise admissable under these rules,
is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue or issues to be decided by the trier of
the fact.''
POINT THREE
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS RESPECTING DAMAGES IS A CORRECT STATEMENT OF THE LAW WITH
RESPE.CT THERETO.

Although, as appellants' brief states, the main issue
of the case involves the question of entitlement to the
property as discussed above, appellants also contend the
court erred in giving Instruction No. 13 which dealt with
dmnages ·which the jury might award to respondents.
Upon the instructions given, the jury awarded plaintiffs the sum of $295.00.
Before discussing the legal questions involved, comInent should be 1nade on the conversations of court
and counsel relative to a settle1nent of the dmnage ques-
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tion al'ter the jury retired to deliberate and as counsel
wpn• taking exceptions to instructions. Appellants' brief
('onveys the ilnpreHsion the court was intending to change
its complete instruction with respect to damages. This is
not tlH• ease. After the jury retired to deliberate, the
(·ourt suggested to the parties that they might resolve
their differences with regard to damages by a stipulation
that regardless of the jury's verdict, defendants would
pay plaintiffs one-half the cost of the survey which the
jury found was correct (R. 143). The court was only
expressing a personal impression of a satisfactory settlement of the dmnage question (which would have amounted to $240.00 as the case turned out). Apart from the
possibility that the parties n1ight stipulate to such a settlement, these con1ments were not intensfed to have any
effect in the case.

Turning then to the instruction given, each part will
be discussed in the order given by the court. Part (a)
of the instruction was a correct statement of the la\v that
for wrongful detention and use of property the measure
of dan1ages is the reasonable rental value of the pren1ises
during the period for which the damages are claimed.
See Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 518, 199 Pac. 670
nt 677-8; 15 A1n. Jur., p. 540, Damages, Section 131.
~Ir. Holt, a real estate appraiser, was the only witness with respect to the value of the premises. He testified that the fair market value of the lot used by defendants was $2500.00 (R. 35), and that the reasonable rental
value for such a lot would be $250.00 per year (R. 36).
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In appellants' brief it is contended there is no evidence
of any rental value, based on the witness's statement in
response to a question from the ·Court that property was
of value to the public only for cabins.
The net effect of this testimony is that of creating
a factual question for the jury as to what was the reasonable rental value of the property, and the Court so instructed the jury. Appellants used respondents' property
for five and one-half years as a cabin site. This was the
precise use for which the land had its value.
Part (b) of the instruction dealt with cost of removal
of structures put on land by appellants and reRtoration
of premises by plaintiff. The costs of ren1oving structures from pren1ises wrongfully placed thereon and
restoring the premises to their former condition is
recoverable as damage against the wrongdoer. Blood
vs. Cohen) 330 l\1ass. 385, 113 N. E. 2d -±-±8. The court
instructed the jury that they could take into account
that respondents might not incur any expense for this
item unless respondents desired to remove the structures.
l\1r. Ketchum, an expert witness with respect to demolition and moving of structures, testified that in order
to remove the structure without substantial damage to
trees and foliage, it would cost respondents $100.00
(R. 31).
In part (c) of the instruction, the court instructed
that the jur:· could award to respondents as damages
one-half of the survey costs which the:· might find re~pondents were required to expend as a result of de-
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l't>ndant~ ad~ in putting structures on respondents land
:uHl refusing to rmnove the1n. The evidence is clear
that in the conversations between appellants and respondents, appellants indicated that if respondents could
dt>uwn~trate where the correct property line was, appellants would remove the structures (R. 47, 87). Re~pondents advised appellants that if they would not
remove the cabin otherwise, respondents would be forced
to have the survey made to show where the correct line
wa8 ( R. -t 7-8). The survey costs in this case are not
c.ontended for as a matter of taxable costs, such as
the authorities cited in appellants' brief consider, but
rather as dmnages directly and proximately resulting
from appellants' tortious conduct in erecting a cabin
on respondents' land and refusing to remove it.

It is submitted that in such a case the entire
amount of the survey expenses should be recoverable.
However, the trial court followed the ruling of this court
in the case of Davvs vs. Dav~s, 111 Utah 324, 178 Pac.
(2nd) 394, wherein this court approved the assessment
of costs of surveys of land evenly between the landowners in an action between adjoining landowners Involving the location of the true boundary line.
Here we have a situation where respondents would
not have incurred the survey costs but for appellants
building the cabin on respondents' land. In such a
situation, these survey expenses are properly awarded
as damages.
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In considering the damages as a whole, it cannot
be contended that the appellants have received unjust
treatment in the verdict of $295.00 for five and one-half
years use of respondents' land. By comparison, respondents paid out $685.34 in survey expenses alone in order
to get the survey line correctly established so appellants
would get off their land. Manifestly, the establishment
of a correct boundary line is of equal benefit to both
adjoining landowners. It is therefore submitted that
there was no prejudicial error cmmnitted in connection
with the damages awarded by the jury in this case.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully urged that there was no error
committed prejudicing appellants and the judgment
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
STEPHENS, BRAYTON &
LOWE and THOMAS C.
CUTHBERT,
Attorneys for Respondents
1001 \Y alker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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